How Should the ROK and US Prepare for Various North Korean Contingencies to Promote and Shape the Satisfactory Unification of the Korean Peninsula?

• 영문명: How Should the ROK and US Prepare for Various North Korean Contingencies to Promote and Shape the Satisfactory Unification of the Korean Peninsula?
• 발행기관: 한국전략문제연구소
• 저자명: Douglas Paal
• 간행물 정보: 『전략연구』통권 제61호(특별호), 119~130쪽, 전체 12쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정치외교학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2014.02.28

영문 초록

The situation in North Korea underwent an enormous qualitative change over the past two months. This qualitative change heightens the urgency of a potential crisis for the North and could increase the consequent pressures for unification of the peninsula. Kim Jung Un’s decision to purge and execute Jang Song Thaek, and, more significantly, the manner in which he chose to do so, have driven dangerous cracks throughout the edifice of North Korean power. The power structure is itself now more dangerous to its occupants than before, and their behavior is likely to be more threatening to outsiders than previously. As South Korea and the United States enter into the 2014 round of military exercises in the coming spring, I will be surprised if we do not witness a replay of the North’s (fourth) nuclear weapons test, more long range missile launches, and tough posturing toward South Korea, with a heightened potential for retaliation by the South. But this time, who will deliver the cautious warnings from China? Will Kim Jung Un play out the ritualistic springtime elevation of threats in order to be rewarded by the South and the West, or will he miscalculate?Moreover, as stresses are building in North Korea and the means to manage them decreasing, the Obama administration has nonetheless demonstrated a greater focus on its own domestic politics than on the potential of the region for a crisis. But diplomatic drift cannot be an option at this stage in North Korea’s succession process, given the heightened risks outlined above. If Kim decides to fly a missile over Japan again, will Tokyo and Seoul be able to coordinate their response and countermeasures?The key will be patient reconstruction of channels of communications among Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, and Washington, perhaps with Washington serving to catalyze the talks so the other parties will not be forced to “make the first move.” As a first step, the Government of Japan needs to be asked to consider how it will compensate for Abe’s recent provocative behavior and work to improve the atmosphere for dialogue. The White House was contemplating a visit by President Obama to Japan in April, but plainly the prospects for this have been placed in doubt by Abe’s visit to Yasukuni. Japan needs now to contemplate and plan for initiatives to redress the concerns of Japan’s neighbors and the US. President Obama should find time for a stop in the Republic of Korea in April, whether or not terms can be reached for a successful visit to Japan. The imperative for such a visit was always present, but now it has been magnified by the qualitative change in the North and the renewed political tensions between Japan and its neighbors. It is therefore imperative for responsible officials to take the initiative to rebuild normal channels of communication, develop mutual reassurance mechanisms, and find ways to climb down from sensitive territorial disputes in the months ahead. Redlines need to be established and made clear to Pyongyang. Goalposts need to be identified, such as the absolute requirement for the North to take the “pre-steps” necessary to resuming multi-party nuclear talks (ceasing nuclear activities including reprocessing, returning to its 2005 commitments, readmitting the International Atomic Energy Administration [IAEA] inspectors, a moratorium on rocket and nuclear tests), responsible officials deputized, and time tables established to stabilize and ultimately normalize the region’s diplomacy. If four-party cooperation on North Korea among Japan, China, the US and the ROK are not presently possible, and if trilateral talks including China, the US, and the ROK are to take time, then Seoul and Washington should not hesitate to begin bilateral diplomatic and military planning for possible contingencies.

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