How Should the ROK and US Prepare for Various North Korean Contingencies to Promote and Shape the Satisfactory Unification of the Korean Peninsula?

• 영문명: How Should the ROK and US Prepare for Various North Korean Contingencies to Promote and Shape the Satisfactory Unification of the Korean Peninsula?
• 발행기관: 한국전략문제연구소
• 저자명: Geunwook Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『전략연구』통권 제61호(특별호), 89~108쪽, 전체 20쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정치외교학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2014.02.28

영문 초록

North Korea is a failed and a failing state. Under the circumstances, many are discussing the “North Korean Contingency” with specific focus upon “collapse of North Korea” and its consequences. There seems to be a social consensus over the necessity of cooperation between the ROK and the US, but potential disagreements have not yet fully explored between the allies. It is natural and undeniable that Seoul and Washington have different – therefore, conflicting – as well as common interests over the North Korean contingency. Like all of alliance members, they will try to take advantage of each other and will pass the bucks in order to maximize their interest even while pursuing the common interests. Under the circumstances, it is more important to accept the existence of conflicting interests and to manage the differences rather than to eliminate them. The ROK and the US would find three issues difficult to reach consensus over the North Korean Contingency. First, who would lead the intervention? South Korea believes that Seoul will be in charge of the intervention, but Washington might disagree. Beijing would not be happy about Seoul’s leading role and its potential take-over of Pyongyang; and Washington is clearly aware of the unhappiness by the Chinese. Therefore, the American would not be supportive for South Korea’s ambition. Second, what to pursue? The ROK aims to stabilize North Korea and to integrate the Northern part of the Peninsula under its flag: therefore, Seoul will focus upon disarming – demobilizing – reintegrating the North Koreans, in addition to securing the social infrastructure in North Korea. In contrast, the United States is seriously concerned about possible WMD proliferation out of North Korea into the hands of terror groups. The Americans believe that the best way to prevent a nuclear terrorism is for the American soldiers to go deep into North Korea and to check out North Korea’s WMD facilities. Third, how many soldiers are to be required? The Americans want the ROK to build manpower oriented military power for pacifying North Korea, despite Seoul’s ambition to modernize its weapon systems. The key to solve the differences is South Korea’s dilemma over the North Korean contingency. If well managed, the contingency would not require Seoul’s role but international institutions and regional powers would stabilize the situation with South Korea’s minor assistance. But, the contingency would be over and Seoul would not take heavy burden. If poorly managed and unstable, the ROK is expected to lead the intervention since South Korea is the only country with political resolve for North Korea. However, the contingency would lead to further instability, which might exhaust South Korea’s resources altogether. Also, the ROK and the US disagree over China’s intervention. Washington believes that South Korea’s intervention would encourage China to cross the border, while Seoul is afraid that a US-led WMD search would lead to Chinese intervention. Both – Seoul and Washington – do not want to see Beijing’s troops in North Korea, but they justify their fears and defend their positions with different logic. The disagreements can be and should be overcome. This is cooperation. The ROK-US alliance is a priceless strategic asset for Seoul in unifying the Peninsula; given the different interests, South Korea and the United States should discuss their positions and try to build more agreements. And public and open discussions are required between scholars as well as policy-makers. To paraphrase Georges Clemenceau, the North Korean contingency is too important to be left only to diplomats and politicians.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Subject of the Intervention: Who would lead the Intervention?

Ⅲ. Objectives of the Intervention: What would be the Top Priority?

Ⅳ. Tools of Intervention: How Many Soldiers are Required?

Ⅴ. The North Korean Contingency, China, and the Dilemmas

Ⅵ. What to Prepare for the North Korean Contingency?