How Should the ROK and the US Manage the North Korean WMD Issue to Promote and Shape the Satisfactory Unification of the Korean Peninsula?

• 영문명: How Should the ROK and the US Manage the North Korean WMD Issue to Promote and Shape the Satisfactory Unification of the Korean Peninsula?
• 발행기관: 한국전략문제연구소
• 저자명: Bruce Klingner
• 간행물 정보: 『전략연구』통권 제61호(특별호), 51~69쪽, 전체 19쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정치외교학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2014.02.28

영문 초록

Reunification of the Korean Peninsula remains a heartfelt objective for the Korean people. Yet polls show declining South Korean support for reunification, particularly amongst the younger generations. Belligerent North Korean behavior and resistance to reform, as well as growing South Korean concerns about its national economy, have constrained progress or even enthusiasm for reunification. Korean unification would require either fundamental reform by North Korea or the collapse of the regime. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-un has clearly demonstrated that he will be as resistant to reform as his predecessors were. The North Korean leadership may have changed two years ago, but it is quite clear that the policies haven’t. As for collapse, the North Korean regime has shown remarkable resilience, belying repeated predictions of imminent demise from domestic and international threats. Peaceful unification would first require meaningful reconciliation through improved inter-Korean engagement. President Park Geun-hye is attempting another variant of South Korean engagement with North Korea through her trust-building policy. Pyongyang has also made clear that it has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-un demonstrated his willingness to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula to dangerous levels in early 2013, threatening nuclear attacks against the United States and South Korea. Although North Korea is currently in its “charm offensive” phase, it is only a matter of time before the regime inevitably reverts to provocations. While Kim Jong-un has maintained his father’s policies, he appears to be implementing them in a more brutal, volatile, and unpredictable way. Since Kim Jong-un ascended to power, North Korean actions don’t appear directed toward achieving identifiable objectives nor has he played the diplomatic card as skillfully as his father. While his father incrementally raised tensions to allow Washington and its allies time to buy their way back to the status quo, Jong-un simultaneously unleashes several threats to no discernible purpose. There is also a greater risk of miscalculation and escalation since Kim Jong-un lacks experience and may stumble across red lines that his predecessors would have known not to cross. Moreover, he may be unaware that South Korea is far more likely to respond to even a North Korean tactical attack than before. US, South Korea, and Japanese willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with North Korea is minimal without a significant change in North Korean resistance to fulfill its denuclearization pledges. The Obama Administration’s response to North Korea’s nuclear threats has been characterized by firm rhetoric and minimalist measures, in contrast to stronger punitive measures imposed on Iran which provided greater incentive for Tehran to eventually return to negotiations. Despite declaring that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program was a “threat to the US national security and to international peace and security,” President Obama has implemented a timid policy that only incrementally increase punishments on Pyongyang for its repeated defiance of the international community. The United States and South Korea should have no illusions about Kim Jong-un. The North Korean threat -- always high -- has gotten worse under the young leader. North Korea now seems like a runaway train careening down the tracks with a volatile, unpredictable engineer pushing firmly forward on the throttle. There can be debate as to how to best respond to the situation. But there should be no debate as to how dangerous the situation could become.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Battle for Power, Not Policy in Pyongyang.

Ⅲ. Concerns Over Regime Stability

Ⅳ. Expect Rough Waters Ahead

Ⅴ. Dealing with North Korea’s WMD Problem

Ⅵ. Need For Enhanced Sanctions

Ⅶ. What the US Should Do

Ⅷ. What Seoul Should Do

Ⅸ. Conclusion