학술논문
[특집] TND체계와 동아시아 안보질서
이용수 6
- 영문명
- Theater Missile Defense(TMD)and East Asian Security Order
- 발행기관
- 한국전략문제연구소
- 저자명
- 김우상
- 간행물 정보
- 『전략연구』통권 제23호, 6~39쪽, 전체 34쪽
- 주제분류
- 사회과학 > 정치외교학
- 파일형태
- 발행일자
- 2001.11.30
6,880원
구매일시로부터 72시간 이내에 다운로드 가능합니다.
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국문 초록
영문 초록
I. Introduction Since the end of the Cold war, the international system is led by the United States. This current system is called the “Pax Americana” or at least considered the U.S.-centered system. The recently inaugurated U.S. President George W. Bush has emphasized that the United States would make every effort to maintain its hegemonic, stable international order and pursue the national missile defense(NMD) and the theater missile defense(TMD) program. II. National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense Within the U.S. Department of Defense, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is responsible for managing, directing, and executing the U.S. ballistic missile defense program. The U.S. has adopted the concept of “layered defense.” National missile defense for the entire U.S. homeland constitutes one layer. A second layer consists of upper-tier systems for theater or regional defense, including THAAD and NTW. Below this layer is a lower-tier for area defense, including PAC-3 and Navy Area Program. III. U.S. NMD and TMD Strategy According to the power transition theory, when a declining dominant power is challenged by a rapidly growing and dissatisfied great power war between the relatively declining hegemonic power and the rapidly increasing challenger is most likely. Relative power changes among those hegemonic power and other great powers in the system occur incrementally in a 20 to 30 year period and are hardly noticed by the members of the system. When the overtaking of the hegemonic power by a rapidly growing challenging power is at its last stage, the declining hegemonic power begins to recognize the potential challenge and tries to rebuild its own hegemonic power position in the system. According to the hegemonic stability theory, that kind of efforts by the declining hegemonic power is not so successful and the declining dominant power and its challenger usually ends up with a hegemonic war. The power transition and hegemonic stability theories suggest that the best way for the hegemonic power to keep stable international system is to maintain preponderance in power over any potential challenger. The United States considers blocking the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, eliminating the possibility of the advent of regional hegemon, and maintaining and spreading free market system and democracy in the system as its vital national interests. The U.S., with its NMD and TMD program, will not only check potential challenge by China in East Asia and by Russia in Eurasia but prepare in advance for preponderance in power over any potential challenger. The U.S. has introduced Japan to its TMD R&D and expects South Korea to participate in its TMD program as well. The U.S. even considers to provide the TMD system to Taiwan. This effort by the U.S. indicates its will to maintain the hegemonic stability in the years to come. IV. Responses to NMD and TMD Program Most of the major powers in the system are against the U.S. NMD and TMD program. China is strongly against the TMD program. First of all, China worries about the Taiwan's involvement in the TMD program. China is also threatened by the fact that Japan's participation in the TMD R&D may promote its remilitarization. Russia is strongly against NMD and TMD program and threatens the U.S. that in case the U.S. keeps on pursuing NMD and TMD program Russia may abrogate the ABM treaty. Even the NATO members such as France, Germany, and Great Britain do not support the U.S. NMD and TMD program. South Korea has already declared that it is not interested in participating in TMD program. Only Taiwan shows a strong interest in participating in TMD program. V. TMD and South Korea's Strategy The South Korean government has already announced that the ROK military does not plan to participate in the U.S. TMD program. While acknowledging South Korea's vulnerability to a North Korean missile attack,
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 국가미사일방어 및 전구미사일방어체계^6)
Ⅲ. 미국의 NMD및TMD전략
Ⅳ. NMD및TMD체계에 대한 각국의 입장
Ⅴ. 결론:TMD와 한국의 안보전략
키워드
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