대리인 이론의 적용을 통한 반부패정책연구

• 영문명: A study on the anti-corruption policies through principal-agent model
• 발행기관: 한국부패학회
• 저자명: 오필환(Oh Phil Hwan)
• 간행물 정보: 『한국부패학회보』제10권 제2호, 39~63쪽, 전체 25쪽
• 주제분류: 법학 > 민법
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2005.06.30

영문 초록

The principal-agent model support to understand the contractual relationship in public society. The contractual relationship can be violated easily for the information asymmetry between principal and agent. The problems of contractual relationship are moral hazard and reverse selection. Moral hazards of public officials result in corruption and bribery. This paper is to apply the agency theory to analyze sources of corruption and the anti-corruption policies. The moral hazard of public officials can be controlled by citizen participation and governance system. Decentralization and delegation of power can reduce the possibility of moral hazard. The cost of monitoring to reduce moral hazard and reverse selection is likely to be substantially lower through these policies and provoke to make transparent and credible society.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 대리인 이론 개요

Ⅲ. 대리인 문제의 반부패 정책에 적용

Ⅳ. 결론

참고문헌

키워드

principal-agent model moral hazard anticorruption policy