Is An Export Subsidy Socially Beneficial under Corruption?

• 발행기관: 한국농업경제학회
• 저자명: Guedae Cho
• 간행물 정보: 『농업경제연구』55권 3호, 191~206쪽, 전체 16쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2014.09.30

영문 초록

According to the influential model suggested by Brander and Spencer(1985), an increasing export subsidy can increase a market share of the firm in foreign markets and a social welfare of the country under the assumption of neutral government. In this paper, using the concept of a politically realistic objective function (PROF), I try to develop a policy decision model when the government decision makers are corrupt. Within this particular setup, the theoretical finding of the paper shows that a collusion equilibrium can exist between policy makers and high cost firm. In this case, agricultural export can be increased with an export subsidy, however, it is not socially beneficial.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Model

Ⅲ. The Neutral Government

Ⅳ. A Corrupt Government

Ⅴ. Discussion and Conclusion

키워드

export subsidy corruption sub-game perfect equilibrium politically realistic objective function