適正稅務調査制度

• 영문명: An Optimal Tax Audit Mechanism : Models, and Evidences from a Tax Payment Function
• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: 박재완(Bahk, Jaewan)
• 간행물 정보: 『재정논집』재정논집 제8권, 3~30쪽, 전체 28쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1994.03.31

영문 초록

Sicne tax evasion, a moral hazard rooted in information asymmetry, causes inefficiency as well as distorting income deistribution, conscious policies are needed to abate its harm. Focusing on the self-employed. we explore ’Family Income and Expenditure Survey., We also examine: (1) tax payment factors (2) the income tax gap between self-employed(SELF) households(HHs) and ‘pay-as-you-earn’(PAYE) employee HHs: and (3) the effect of the tax audit rule on compliance. Though it saves audit resoures and seizes evaders’ risk premium. a cutoff audit- currently adopted in korea featuring “reporting guidelines” is shown to lower social welfare due to its built - in regressive bias. The line drawing hinders self-compliance as well. An endogenous audit with the audit chance declining in reported income without truncation is desirable for Inequality-averse society. At least. the cutoff must be kept secret to taxpayers. The empirical analysis shows: (1) One-third of SELF HHs are outside tax enforcement: (2) SELF HHs Pay less income tax than PAYE HHs by 46% to 60%, ceteris paribus. The tax gap widens with income: (3) The elasticity with income tax payment to income is less than one for SELF HHs. conflicting with progressive tax shedule : (4) SELF HHs’ elasticity is lower around their mean income than at tails’ which reflects the adverse of the cutoff audit: and (5) Tax enforcement is ineffective to capital income.

목차

Ⅰ. 머리말

Ⅱ. 稅務調査制度의 理論模型

Ⅲ. 納稅函數의 推定

Ⅳ. 맺음말

참고문헌