관료의 행동에 관한 연구

• 영문명: The Behavior of Bureaucrats : Emphasis on the choice Between Single-Purpose and Multi-Purpose Authorities
• 발행기관: 호남대학교 인문사회과학연구소
• 저자명: 최성수(Choi Sung-Su)
• 간행물 정보: 『인문사회과학연구』제6집, 347~362쪽, 전체 16쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 사회과학일반
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1999.12.30

영문 초록

The constitutional choice between single-purpose and multi-purpose authorities is analyzed in a model describing the local decision-making process as a game between a sponsor, representing the voters, and two bureaus, The bureaus are able to influence public decisions by using private information about production costs. In this context, the bureaus always benefit from coordinated cost reporting, whereas the effect on voter welfare is shown to depend on the sign of the Cournot cross-price-elasticities. Given that collusion is more likely to occur in multi-purpose authorities, the analysis provides some guidelines when choosing between single-purpose and multi-purpose authorities.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 분석모형

Ⅲ. 관료의 담합

Ⅳ. 정부조직에 대한 함의

Ⅴ. 결론

참고문헌

Abstract