[특집] 북한의 WMD에 대한 인식ㆍ접근전략ㆍ정책방향

• 영문명: A South Korea's Strategy toward North Korea's WMD
• 발행기관: 한국전략문제연구소
• 저자명: 윤덕민
• 간행물 정보: 『전략연구』통권 제30호, 70~94쪽, 전체 25쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정치외교학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2004.03.31

영문 초록

Since the secret HEU program was revealed. North Korea has taken a series of tough measures, from withdrawing from the NPT to threatening a nuclear test, according to the 10-year-old policy of successful brinkmanship. North Korea also urges that, to solve the problem, the US should sign a non-aggression treaty with North Korea The non-aggression treaty is a new demand raised by North Korea during the history of 20 years of negotiatioa A close review of these protracted negotiations tells us much about North Korea's intentions. First, North Korea is consistently approaching nuclear armament, step by step, in spite of its several commitments to denuclearization. Whenever they faced an obstacle, they bypassed it. When the patience of the international community wore out, they agreed to give up and then devised another way to continue. The 20 years of negotiations show how surprisingly well North Korea has sticked to a go nuclear policy. North Korean has never given up its ambition. Second, the price of abandonment has gradually escalated in every negotiatioa In the first negotiation in the 1980s, as we have shown above, their demand was mainly military hardware. Next time around, it escalated to the withdrawal of the US tactical nuclear weapons and the suspension of ROK-US annual military exercise, in return for IAEA inspections. And through the first nuclear crisis, it went up to a package settlement in which all their wants were met, including light water reactors, heavy fuel oil, economic aid, political normalization, no use or threat of nuclear weapons and so oa Now, North Korea's position has evolved into demanding a non-aggression treaty with the US. Since expelling inspectors and declaring the resumption of its nuclear weapons program last January, North Korea has been in a position to strategically maneuver its plutonium producing capability. North Korea now stands at the momentous point of nuclear armament. If North Korea fully utilizes its nuclear infrastructure and if we fail to prevent it, North Korea could reach the capacity to produce over 50 bombs per year by 2007, thereby possessing over 200 bombs, equivalent to the number possessed by China by 2010. What is more concerning is that North Korea could emerge as a new nuclear power based on minimal strategic meaning within six months if it decides to. If North Korea decides to reprocess all of its spent fuel rods, it could in theory rapidly acquire 6 to 7 bombs, equivalent to the capacity of South Africa before dismantling. It is meaningless to say that North Korea's intentions are no more than creating a bargaining chip to trade away at the best price since it already has a nuclear infrastructure enabling to build a meaningful nuclear force within a short period of time. Carefully reviewing the 20 years of negotiations with North Korea and its nuclear capability, we find that North Korea has a dual intention to pursue nuclear weapons, while at the same time utilizing it as a bargaining chip to gain political and economic interests. North Korea has sought to keep their options open by pursuing the nuclear weapons program while simultaneously seeking a better relationship with the US, as well as economic aid. It seems that North Korea has sought by all means to become a meaningful nuclear power, in the same way that Pakistan did. But any intention can evolve. North Korea now stands at a crossroads: to have nuclear weapons or to have a viable economy through co-existence with the international community. Kim Jung-il should be agonizing over this cost/benefit analysis. To our surprise, the current behavioral pattern of North Korea since the disclosure of its clandestine HEU program shows a remarkable similarity to that of the first nuclear crisis, specifically after the IAEA demanded a special inspection to clarify suspected waste sites, in early 1993. First, in both cases,

목차

Ⅰ. 북한을 둘러산 전략환경 평가

Ⅱ. 북한의 WMD 개발 의도와 정책방향

Ⅲ. 주변 관련국가들의 입장 평가

Ⅳ. 철저하고 과함한 접근

Ⅴ. 고려사항

키워드

북한 핵 미사일 대북협상 전략