Arbitrator’s Reputation and PR Cost: A Signaling Approach

• 영문명: Arbitrator’s Reputation and PR Cost: A Signaling Approach
• 발행기관: 한국중재학회
• 저자명: 권준엽 김성룡
• 간행물 정보: 『중재연구』제33권 제3호, 129~146쪽, 전체 18쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2023.09.30

영문 초록

We construct a signaling game model between the arbitrator and claimants, in which the arbitrator’s marketing amount is adopted as the signaling device. Assuming that the parties to the dispute select an arbitrator, and if there is a difference in the arbitrator's fee depending on the arbitrator's reputation, the arbitrator will pay to further enhance his reputation. We would like to analyze the cost differences between arbitrators who already have a high reputation and arbitrators who strive to further enhance their reputation using the signal model. From the Analysis of our study, We derive perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game and refine the equilibrium into a unique equilibrium by invoking the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Further, we characterize the refined equilibrium.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Background

Ⅲ. Model

Ⅳ. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria

Ⅴ. Refinement of Separating Equilibria

Ⅵ. Comparative Statics

Ⅶ. Conclusion

References

키워드

arbitration arbitrator signaling game Reputation Arbitrator Fee