Note: Does Uncertain Future Hamper Cooperation?

• 발행기관: 서울대학교 경제연구소
• 저자명: Jinwoo Park
• 간행물 정보: 『Seoul Journal of Economics』Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 9 No.3, 223~228쪽, 전체 5쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1996.09.30

영문 초록

In this paper, a counter example is constructed to show that the equilibrium strategy of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) can not be applied when players have incomplete information about the future stage game. When the future stage game is uncertain, players have ex-post incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy of Fudenberg and Maskin since the ex-ante future punishment is not sufficiently severe.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Motivation

Ⅱ. A Counter Example

Ⅲ. Comments

References