Transfer Paradox and Bargaining Solutions

• 발행기관: 서울대학교 경제연구소
• 저자명: Youngsub Chun
• 간행물 정보: 『Seoul Journal of Economics』Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 9 No.3, 181~190쪽, 전체 9쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1996.09.30

영문 초록

We investigate whether bargaining solutions are immune to the transfer paradox for n-person bargaining problems. We show that two families of bargaining solutions, one generalizing the Nash solution and another generalizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, are immune to the strong transfer paradox requiring the donor gains and the recipient loses. Also, we present examples demonstrating that the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are subject to the weak transfer paradox so that the donor and the recipient could gain together or lose together.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Preliminaries

Ⅲ. Results

References