Monopsony, Price Squeezing, and Sub-optimality

• 영문명: Monopsony, Price Squeezing, and Sub-optimality
• 발행기관: 서울대학교 경제연구소
• 저자명: 박상인
• 간행물 정보: 『Seoul Journal of Economics』Volume 36 No.2, 221~232쪽, 전체 12쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2023.05.31

영문 초록

Monopsony has been a hot issue recently. A traditional view is that monopsony is harmless to consumers unless it results in higher prices downstream. In this study, I present a theoretical model in which the monopsonist may engage in price squeezing but cannot commit not to engage in advance. This lack of commitment (holdup problem) leads to two types of sub-optimality: (i) the monopsony reduces intermediate-good producers’ incentive for relationshipspecific investments, leading to sub-optimal investments and lowered wages, and (ii) the monopsonist may choose vertical overintegration.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Model

Ⅲ. Conclusion

References

키워드

Monopsony Price Squeezing Sub-optimal Investments Vertical Over-integration