Credit Rationing with a Moral Hazard Problem

• 발행기관: 서울대학교 경제연구소
• 저자명: Jeeman Jung
• 간행물 정보: 『Seoul Journal of Economics』Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 13 No.2, 165~183쪽, 전체 18쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2000.06.30

영문 초록

This paper examines an alternative model of credit rationing when moral hazard is present in the credit market. Two regimes are considered: one with a continuous trading assumption and the other with a restriction on trading. Continuous trading enables one to construct a riskless hedging portfolio and therefore leads to market failure. Under restrictions on trading, however, the entrepreneur of a firm does not undertake an extremely risky activity and the optimal strategy depends on the amount of debt: the larger the amount of debt, relative to the value of a firm's assets, the greater the entrepreneur's incentive to follow a risky strategy. In this situation, credit rationing is beneficial to lenders.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Theoretical Models

Ⅲ. Credit Ratiioning and Determination of Equilibrium

Ⅳ. Conclusion

References

키워드

Moral hazard credit rationing Continuous trading