Contests with Externalities

• 발행기관: 서울대학교 경제연구소
• 저자명: Sanghack Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『Seoul Journal of Economics』Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 13 No.2, 123~134쪽, 전체 11쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2000.06.30

영문 초록

This paper examines contests in which aggregate efforts generate positive externalities to participants. In such contests the equilibrium effort may exceed or fall short of the socially optimal level of effort. This paper derives the relationship between the equilibrium effort, the size of prize, and the socially optimal level of effort. The equilibrium effort proves to exceed the social optimum when it is less than the prize times the exponent R of the Tullock (1980) contest-success function. On the other hand, when the equilibrium effort is greater than the prize times the exponent R, it indeed falls short of the social optimum.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. The Model

Ⅲ. Concluding Remarks

References

키워드

Contest externality social optimum