Robust Double Auction Mechanisms

• 영문명: Robust Double Auction Mechanisms
• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: 윤기호(Kiho Yoon)
• 간행물 정보: 『JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS』Vol.34 No.4, 36~49쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2023.12.31

영문 초록

We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, expost individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in any robust mechanism does not depend on the valuations of the trading players. We next establish that, with a non-bossiness assumption, the price in any robust mechanism does not depend on players’ valuations at all, whether trading or non-trading. Our main result is the characterization result that, with a nonbossy assumption along with other assumptions on the properties of the mechanism, the generalized posted mechanism in which a constant price is posted for each possible set of traders is the only robust double auction mechanism.

목차

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE CHARACTERIZATION

3. CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

키워드

Double auction posted price robust mechanism design dominant strategy budget balance