상호 에이전시관계와 평가지표 구조

• 영문명: Reciprocal Agency and Performance Measure: Implications for Subcontracting, M-Form and Governance in Japan
• 발행기관: 한일경상학회
• 저자명: 최강식(Kang Sik Choi)
• 간행물 정보: 『한일경상논집』제39권, 135~160쪽, 전체 26쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경영학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2008.02.28

영문 초록

In this paper, we explain such reciprocal relationships under different organizations in terms of optimal tradeoff between incentive-provision and risk-sharing. We analyze a simple model of principal and agent, in which two firms play interchanging roles of agent and principal, and show that optimal contracts can provide more incentives in reciprocal relationships. We show that reciprocal relationships alleviate or strengthen moral hazard. In fact, the optimal incentive coefficient for the second-period agent increases because the inference from the first-period results in more uncertainties. We observe reciprocal relationships among firms in the subcontractor system to explain some features.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 기본 모형

Ⅲ. 분석결과

Ⅳ. 일본 기업/산업/정부 조직의 경제적 함의

Ⅴ. 결론

참고문헌

키워드

Reciprocal Agency Performance Measure Subcontracting