Ambiguity and Performance-Based Lawyer Compensation Contract in Arbitration

• 발행기관: 한국중재학회
• 저자명: Joon Yeop Kwon Sung Ryong Kim
• 간행물 정보: 『중재연구』제35권 제3호, 111~134쪽, 전체 24쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2025.09.30

국문 초록

This study explores how institutional ambiguity in arbitration affects performance-based compensation for legal professionals. Using a principal-agent model with ambiguity-averse agents, it finds that uncertainty leads to lower effort, less outcome-sensitive contracts, and reduced expected profits for firms. The findings extend contract theory and offer practical guidance for legal service contracting under uncertain arbitration outcomes.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Theoretical Background and Literature Review

Ⅲ. The Model

Ⅳ. Equilibrium Contract

Ⅴ. Ambiguity Effects

Ⅵ. Conclusion

References

키워드

Arbitration Lawer Ambiguity Principal-agent Problem Performance-based Compensation