기업의 임원 격려가 기업가치에 미치는 영향: 중국 선진 A주 상장기업을 중심으로

• 영문명: The Impact of Executive Compensation on Enterprise Value: Focusing on Companies Listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-Shares in China
• 발행기관: 한중경제문화학회
• 저자명: 이임선(Lin-Xian Li)
• 간행물 정보: 『한중경제문화연구』제31권, 107~118쪽, 전체 12쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2025.08.30

국문 초록

This study takes the data of A-share listed companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China from 2016 to 2023 as the research sample, and uses agency theory, information asymmetry theory, incentive theory, and optimal compensation contract theory as the theoretical basis for the research. It analyzes and summarizes previous relevant research at home and abroad, proposes three hypotheses based on the problems encountered by Chinese listed companies in practice, and uses empirical analysis to study the impact of executive equity incentives and compensation incentives on enterprise value of Chinese listed companies. And according to the classification of enterprise property rights, the sample enterprises are divided into two categories: state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. Then, regression analysis is conducted on each group of samples to compare the differences between groups. The empirical analysis results of this study are as follows. Firstly, equity incentives for corporate executives have a positive (+) impact on the company’s operating results. The equity incentive (EI) shows a significant positive (+) value at the 1% level, indicating that the equity incentive (EI) of a company has a positive impact on its operating results (ROA). Secondly, executive compensation incentives have a positive (+) impact on the enterprise value of enterprises. Salary incentive (SALAY) shows a significant positive (+) value at the 10% level. Thirdly, compared with stateowned enterprises, the improvement of executive incentives in non-state-owned enterprises will have a more significant impact on the company’s operating results. This study further demonstrates that appropriate and reasonable executive incentives can increase executive motivation and constrain executive behavior, reduce agency costs, and ultimately improve enterprise value. This study provides a theoretical and practical basis for the government to further improve incentive systems and for enterprises to improve executive incentive programs.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 선행연구

Ⅲ. 연구 가설의 설정 및 연구모형

Ⅳ. 실증분석

Ⅴ. 결 론

참고문헌

키워드

Equity Incentive Enterprise Performance Financial Performance Property Rights Natur