Major Shareholders' Shareholding and Related Party Transactions: Alignment of Interests or Tunneling?

• 발행기관: 글로벌융합연구학회
• 저자명: Xiao-Meng Zhang
• 간행물 정보: 『글로벌융합연구학회지』제4권 제1호, 95~109쪽, 전체 15쪽
• 주제분류: 복합학 > 학제간연구
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2025.03.31

국문 초록

We examine whether major shareholders increase related party transactions (RPTs) through their shareholding and whether such transactions enhance corporate value or result in tunneling that harms the company in this study. Using a sample of all Chinese A-share listed companies from 2019 to 2023. We analyze the effect of major shareholders' shareholding on the level of RPTs. Next, we explore whether major shareholders use RPTs for wealth transfer. Finally, we investigate the extent to which major shareholders engage in tunneling through RPTs.The findings reveal a significant positive relationship between the shareholding of major shareholders and the level of RPTs(operating RPTs),while a significant negative correlation between major shareholders and the non-operating related party transactions.Our results show that the interaction term between RPTs and major shareholders' shareholding is positively correlated with Tobin's Q. However, we find no significant relationship between the interaction term of RPTs and major shareholders' shareholding and the level of earnings management. Similarly, when RPTs are categorized into operating and non-operating transactions, no evidence supports that such transactions are used for earnings maniulation.

목차

1. Introduction

2. Theoretical Background

3. Research Design

4. Empirical Analysis and Results

5. Conclusion

References

키워드

Major Shareholder Shareholding Related Party Transaction Company Value Earnings Management