[특집] 북한 핵개발의 현황과 아국의 대응방향

• 영문명: Nuclear Development in North Korea and the ROK Countermeasures in the Future
• 발행기관: 한국전략문제연구소
• 저자명: 신성택
• 간행물 정보: 『전략연구』통권 제20호, 6~81쪽, 전체 76쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정치외교학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2000.10.31

영문 초록

Neither single person nor an organization could answer the following question with confidence: “Has North Korea developed and is now in possession of nuclear weapons?” Some of the conservative American scholars claim that North Korea has aJready developed and has nuclear weapons: however, those who are in responsible positions in the government tend to take more cautious stance. The conclusion whether or not North Korea possesses nuclear weapons should be reserved until the critical parts of the light-water reactors are transferred to North Korea for the completion of the KEDO project. Only then the lAEA could conduct investigations on the transparency of the “past” nuclear activities of North Korea. On the other hand, there are those who insist that North Korea just pretends to develop nuclear programs in order to gain leverage in negotiations with the ROK, the Us, and Japan: that is, North Korea has not developed nuclear weapons and thus, it does not possess any nuclear arms. All in all, it is more difficult to find the proof for North Korean possession of nuclear weapons than to find the proof for North Korea not having any. When a nation is determined to possess its nuclear arms as an absolute necessity for its security at any cost as was the cases of Israel India, Pakistan and others, it was impossible for any power to block it. North Korea is determined to do so for the survival of its political system. The US intelligence community appears to believe that North Korea possesses the amount of plutonium for the production of one or two nuclear weapons rather than in possession of the real nuclear weapons at the present moment. North Korean defectors Hwang Jang Yop and Kim Duk Hong revealed in an interview with a Japanese weekly Aera last April that North Korea must have developed nuclear weapons already by utilizing highly enriched uranium instead of plutonium. About the same time Ed Royce, Deputy Chairman of Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives, insisted that North Korea has already possessed one or two nuclear weapons and that inconsistency in the US policy toward North Korea was responsible for the result. On June this year Japanese Foreign Minister Koumura Masahiko drew our attention by raising the possibility of North Korean possession of nuclear weapons. In answering on doubtful North Korean development of nuclear weapons at the Foreign Affairs Committee of Japanese Diet, Koumura said “North Korea either has extracted plutonium for producing nuclear weapons or already in possession of a plural number of nuclear warheads.” Nothing has been publicly revealed as to the number of North Korean nuclear warheads produced and how many of them are deployed and where. As North Korea maintains an ambivalent stance on its possession of nuclear weapons, allow me to take a detour approach to ascertain the truth: that is, to review North Korean nuclear policy and strategy. Its nuclear policy is based on “dual survival strategy.” North Korea appears to be utilizing it as its final card of survival strategy by demonstrating possession of nuclear weapons, a “devil's club.” At the base of the North Korean nuclear policy lies its penetration strategy of abusing the duality of “atomic power and nuclear weapons” and aiming to surmount its worst economic crisis through its “nuclear weapons development” which is cost-saving, easy to cheat in the international arena, and a guaranteed value-adding business for highest scientific and technological yields. Furthermore, a detour strategy appears to be hidden at its base for escaping out of its international isolation with brinkmanship by making a reverse use of the endeavors exerted by the US and other nations on consolidating NPT system. Confronted with its limits in competition for conventional weapons,

목차

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 북한 핵개발의 동기, 추진경과 분석 및 성공여부 평가

Ⅲ. 북한의 핵개발 현황과 위협

Ⅳ. 대북한 핵협상 경과 및 추이(推移) 분석

Ⅴ. 북한 핵문제 현안의 대응방향

Ⅵ. 북한 핵개발 대응책

Ⅶ. 결론:선택적 핵억제정책의 구현(具現)이 시급하다