[특집] 북한의 핵무기체계에 대한 국제법상 규제

• 영문명: International Legal Restrictions on North Korea's Nuclear Weapon System
• 발행기관: 한국전략문제연구소
• 저자명: 민경길
• 간행물 정보: 『전략연구』통권 제20호, 114~144쪽, 전체 31쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정치외교학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2000.10.31

영문 초록

The Republic of Korea, the United States and the Japan should respect the inter- national law in their relations between the North Korea. However those three Nations who suspect that the latter is developing nuclear weapon system including nuclear war- heads and long-range missiles often reveals their intentions to repress the latter's program by pre-emptive strikes on her alleged nuclear and missiles producing facilities. On the hypothesis that it is not easy to verify whether the North Korea renounced her nuclear weapon system development program, this paper, in the extents of rules of international law, considered about the limits of measures to repress her program. In the legal aspects, the most serious problem, in seeking the solutions to repress the nuclear weapon system development program of the North Korea, is that of sanctions. However, a legal sanctions of the United Nations are not likely realized because of the China's veto-power in the security council. Therefore, when the North Korea's nuclear problems emerged as the hot issue and military tension is heightened in the Korean Peninsular, one of the above-said three nations has suggested to resort to the right of anticipatory self-defence. On the military strategical viewpoint, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence has greater potential relevance to conflicts between smaller or potential nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers, where the assumed aggressor's delivery system may be vulner- able to a first-strike, and where he lacks a second-strike capability. In this circum- stances, the temptations to take “pre-emptive defence” measures may, as in the Israeli 1981 pre-emptive strikes on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, prove irresistable as for the Republic of Korea or the Japan. Moreover, the United States may be in the sympathy with the two States as an military ally with both of them. However, not only in this situation that the North Korea's renunciation of nuclear weapon system development program is not easily verified but also in the possible future situation where she may have succeeded in the development of that system, if one of the above-said nations solely or together with another launches pre-emptive strikes on the alleged or proven nuclear materials and missiles producing facilities of the North Korea, he shall not escape from severe condemnation by the international community. Furthermore, the strikes may be recorded in hitory asthe prelude to the second Korean War where participate all the Super Powers for, under the modem inter- national law, the use of force is legitimate only when the security council authorizes it or it is the resort to the right of self-defence. Of Course, we can not conclusively say that the modern international law expelled the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. However, under the positive rules of modem inter- national law, the pre-emptive action may be justified only when the necessity for action must be instinct, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation. With thorough analysis of the writings of jurists, state practices and international judicial decisions after the Charter of the United Nations, we can not draw any more generous conclusion than above. To launch pre-emptive strikes, asserting the resort to the right of self-defence, on the alleged or proven nuclear materials and missiles producing facilities of the North Korea would not be an legal or realistic solution in this stage. In 1991, when a high official of the Republic of Korea is suspected to have suggested that a commando raid might be necessary for removal of possible nuclear menace from the North Korea, the present writer, in an international symposium, had indicated the illegality of his suggestion and proposed to submit the North Korean nuclear problems to the consideration of the security council of the United Nations. After that, fortunately,

목차

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 북한과의 관계에서 국제법의 적용

Ⅲ. 북한핵 문제의 전개과정

Ⅳ. 핵무기와 선제적 자위권

Ⅴ. 결론

Summary