基于Stackelberg博弈对主导企业收购边缘企业的分析

• 영문명: An Analysis of a Dominant Firm Acquiring a Competitive Fringe Based on Stackelberg Game
• 발행기관: 한중경제문화학회
• 저자명: 夏同水 张延华
• 간행물 정보: 『한중경제문화연구』제1권, 177~187쪽, 전체 11쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2013.08.31

영문 초록

Does an industry go to monopoly when there is no policy control? Supposing there are only a dominant firm and a competitive fringe in an industry with constant returns of scale, which play Stackelberg game, we analyze the industry concentration change if the dominant firm is permitted to acquire the competitive fringe. It is showed that the industry will be in monopoly if there is no investment, or not enough investment of the fringe.

목차

引言

一. 基本假设与模型

二. 模型分析

三. 对上述结果的进一步讨论

四. 结束语

키워드

dominant firm competitive fringe acquisition monopoly