Top-executives Compensation : The Role of Corporate Ownership Structure in Japan

• 발행기관: 한국유통과학회
• 저자명: Mohammed Mehadi Masud Mazumder
• 간행물 정보: 『한국유통과학회 학술대회 논문집』2017년 동계 국제학술대회, 67~68쪽, 전체 2쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2017.12.27

영문 초록

This paper explores the impact of corporate control, measured by ownership structure, on top-executives’ compensation in Japan. According to agency theory, the pay-performance link is expected to be affected by the firm’s ownership structure. Using a sample of 4,411 firm-year observations (401 firms for the 11-years period from 2001 to 2011) for Japanese non-financial firms publicly traded on the first section and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), this study demonstrates that institutional ownership (both financial and corporate) is negatively related to the level of executives’ compensation. Such finding is in line with efficient monitoring hypothesis which claims that the presence of institutional shareholders provides direct monitoring over managers, limits managerial self-dealing and curves the increase in CEO pay. On the other hand, the results also show that managerial ownership is positively related to their compensation which supports managerial power theory hypothesis, i.e. management-controlled firms are more likely to extract more compensation from the business than other firms. Overall, this study confirms that corporate control has significant impact on cash compensation paid to Japanese top-executives after controlling the conventional pay-performance relationship.

목차

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Research Design

References

키워드

Executive compensation Corporate performance Corporate governance Ownership structure Japan