Fiscal Decentralization, Corruption, and Income Inequality: Evidence from Vietnam

• 발행기관: 한국유통과학회
• 저자명: Hung Thanh NGUYEN Thuy Hoang Ngoc VO Duc Doan Minh LE Vu Thanh NGUYEN
• 간행물 정보: 『The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business(JAFEB)』Vol. 7 No.11, 529~540쪽, 전체 12쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2020.11.30

영문 초록

The objective of this research paper is to study the simultaneous relationship between fiscal decentralization, corruption, and income inequality among Vietnamese provinces. We use a balanced panel data set of 63 provinces/cities in Vietnam in the period from 2011 to 2018. The study used 3SLS-GMM (Three Stage Least Squares - Generalized Method of Moments estimator) and GMM-HAC (Generalized Method of Moments - Heteroskedastic and Autocorrelation Consistent estimator). Empirical evidence shows a strong simultaneous relationship: increased corruption will increase regional income disparities, income inequality, and increase fiscal decentralization. In addition, the results also suggest that an increase in per-capita income will reduce the level of corruption, or better control corruption of each province. The degree of increase in income inequality, which reduces fiscal decentralization, is the same for trade liberalization. All demonstrate that there is a simultaneous relationship between fiscal decentralization, corruption, and income inequality. In a region of high public governance quality, fiscal decentralization positively effects its economic growth. This issue will indirectly increase income inequality between provinces within a country. Our findings imply that a country’s fiscal decentralization strategy should be linked to improving corruption control and local governance effectiveness, indirectly improving income inequality between localities or regions.

목차

1. Introduction

2. Literature Review

3. Data Description

4. Models and Estimation Methods

5. Results, Conclusions and Implications

References

키워드

Decentralization Corruption Income Inequality Economic Growth Poverty