Excess Compensation: Agency Cost or Performance Motivator? Perspectives from Governance Structures in Korea

• 발행기관: 한국회계정보학회
• 저자명: Wooseok Choi Eunsuh Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『한국회계정보학회 학술대회발표집』2012년 춘계학술대회 발표집, 709~738쪽, 전체 30쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 회계학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2012.05.19

영문 초록

In this study, we investigate whether govemance structures are associated with excess cash compensation, which is defined as observed cash compensation determinants. Six measures of governance structures are examined in this study: (1) the owner-managers; (2) block-holders; (3) foreign shareholders; (4) institutional investors; (5) financial institutions; and (6) chaebols. Based on 6,823 observations in Korea from 2000 to 2009, the results indicate that governance structures are significantly related to excess cash compensation. Specifically, ownership by block-holders and the magnitude of debts from financial institutions are negatively related to excess cash compensation, whereas ownership by owner-managers and foreign shareholders, and chaebols are positively related to excess cash compensation. An additional test suggests that excess cash compensation is positively associated with current accounting performance of firms. The findings of this study imply that excess cash compensation can be used as a motivator for directors to improve financial performance of firms consistent with Fama (1980), while it can also represent an agency cost consistent with Core et al. (1999) under certain circumstances.

목차

I. INTRODUCTION

II. BACKGROUND: DIRECTORS IN KOREA

III. RELATED LITERATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS

IV. MODELS AND SAMPLE

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: EXCESS COMPENSATION AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

VI. ADDITIONAL TESTS

VII. CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES

키워드

Excess cash compensation Governance Structures Firm performance Agency costs