Related-party Transactions and Asymmetric Cost Behavior

• 발행기관: 글로벌경영학회
• 저자명: Cho Jungeun
• 간행물 정보: 『글로벌경영학회학술대회 발표논문집』2018년 동계학술대회 발표논문집, 385~408쪽, 전체 24쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경영학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2018.11.24

영문 초록

This study examines whether related-party transactions impact firms’ asymmetric cost behavior. We find that firms with higher level of related-party transactions present greater cost stickiness. We also find that related-party transactions in firms with high proportion of largest shareholders’ ownership lead to greater cost stickiness. Our finding suggests that information asymmetry between managers and outside stakeholders caused by related-party transactions triggers managers to maintain unutilized resources even when demand falls so that they can maximize their personal utility, resulting in cost asymmetry. This paper contributes to the extant literature by providing additional evidence that related-party transactions which exacerbate agency problems may lead to cost stickiness.

목차

1. Introduction

2. Theoretical background and hypotheses

3. Research design and sample description

4. Empirical Results

5. Summary and Conclusion

키워드

Related-party Transactions Asymmetric Cost Behavior Largest shareholders’ ownership