Institutionalized Bribes: Entertainment Expenses and Public Procurement Auctions in Korea

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Sungwon Kang(강성원) Daehwan Kim(김대환) Geonhyeong Kim(김건형)
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2019년대 경제학공학술대회-분과회의, 1~34쪽, 전체 34쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2019.02.15

영문 초록

We take the view that business entertainment of public officials is a form of bribery and examine the private benefits of paying bribes and its effects on allocative efficiency. We utilize two unique features of Korea s institutional settings: (i) recent adoption of anti-corruption regulation (Improper Solicitation and Antigraft Act of 2016) that limits the business entertainment of public officials, and (ii) mandatory participation of public entities in online procurement auctions which restricts the type of private benefits that bribe-paying firms can extract. We present empirical evidences consistent with the hypotheses that bribe-paying firms extract benefits by providing low-quality goods and services, and that bribes lower allocative efficiency.

목차

1. Introduction

2. Measuring Bribes from the Responses to the Antigraft Act of 2016

3. Consequences of Bribes

4. Data Sets and Variable Construction

5. Empirical Results

6. Conclusion