A Modified Stackelberg Game for a Duopoly Cruise Market with a Potential New Entrant

• 발행기관: 한국무역연구원
• 저자명: Seong-Cheol Cho Wei Wei
• 간행물 정보: 『무역연구』제13권 제1호, 37~47쪽, 전체 11쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2017.02.28

영문 초록

This paper develops a modified Stackelberg game model for a duopoly market. Unlike the traditional duopoly where the leader and the follower both exist in the market, the modified model supposes a preexisting leader and a follower that has not yet entered the market. This specific situation has often been found recently in many emerging Asian cruise markets as one of the world-class cruise lines initiates a new local cruise market. In spite of the discontinuity of the follower’s reaction function, the Nash equilibrium is found to exist as a pair of optimal capacities of both lines. A decision making criterion is established for the follower to enter the market regarding the fixed-charge incorporated into the follower’s cost function. The optimal capacities of both lines and the resulting market capacities and market shares are computed. A remarkable property is also found that a new monopoly market could result from a duopoly competition by the modified Stackelberg game.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Modified Stackelberg Model and Assumptions

Ⅲ. Nash Equilibrium and Optimal Capacities

Ⅳ. Numerical Example

Ⅴ. Conclusions

키워드

Duopoly Fixed-charge Game Theory Nash Equilibrium Stackelberg