Supermajority Rule in Bicameral Legislatures

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Dongwon Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2015년도 추계학술대회 논문집, 1~32쪽, 전체 32쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2015.09.30

영문 초록

This paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral structure restrain excessive government spending and taxation. Our analysis suggests that supermajority rule has a coun-tervailing effect in bicameral legislatures due to two factors: the geographic linkages across two chambers and the low price elasticity of demand for public goods. Using a panel of 49 American states over a period of 39 years (1970-2008), we find that Senate district fragmentation—the ratio of seats in the House relative to seats in the Senate—has a robust, positive impact on the tendency of a supermajority rule to inflate the budget. Our finding implies that a supermajority rule in bicameral legislatures can have a perverse effect on budget outcomes.

목차

1 Introduction

2 Model of Supermajority Rules in Bicameral Legislatures

3 Empirical Evidence

4 Concluding remarks

키워드

supermajority rule bicameral legislatures legislative bargaining budget institutions