RATIONAL TAX SCHEME BEHIND A VEIL OF IGNORANCE

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: BIUNG-GHI JU JUAN D. MORENO-TERNERO
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2015년도 추계학술대회 논문집, 1~14쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2015.09.30

영문 초록

A BSTRACT . We explore the design of impartial tax schemes when agents’ incomes are completely determined by their inborn talents. Building on Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance approach, we conceptualize an impar-tial observer who chooses a tax scheme without knowing her own vNM utility function, and the distribution of talents, and whose vNM prefer-ences behind the veil obey Harsanyi’s principle of acceptance and are independent of the distribution of talents. Our results in the resulting framework provide three main messages: (i) the veil of ignorance im-plies anonymity of tax schemes; (ii) the veil of ignorance generically rejects utilitarian tax schemes; (iii) the veil of ignorance endorses the (Rawlsian) leveling tax scheme.

목차

1. I NTRODUCTION

2. MODEL

3. RESULTS

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

키워드

veil of ignorance impartiality anonymity leveling tax utili-tarianism.