Stability and the Immediate Acceptance Rule When School Priorities Are Weak

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Wonki Jo Cho Battal Dogan
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2015년도 추계학술대회 논문집, 1~30쪽, 전체 30쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2015.09.30

영문 초록

In a model of school choice, we allow school priorities to be weak and study the preference revelation game induced by the immediate acceptance (IA) rule (also known as the Boston rule), or the IA game. When school priorities can be weak and matches probabilistic, three stability notions—ex post stability, ex ante stability, and strong ex ante stability—and two ordinal equilibrium notions—sd equilibrium and strong sd equilibrium—become available (“sd” stands for stochas-tic dominance). We show that for no combination of stability and equilibrium notions does the set of stable matches coincide with the set of equilibrium matches of the IA game. This stands in contrast with the existing result that the two sets are equal when priorities are strict. We also show that in the presence of weak priorities, the transition from the IA rule to the deferred acceptance rule may, in fact, harm some students.

목차

1 Introduction

2 The Model

3 Fairness and Equilibrium Notions

4 Analysis of the IA Game

5 Revelation Games Induced by Stable Rules

6 Incomplete Information

7 Conclusion

키워드

school choice stability immediate acceptance rule