Free-Riding Chance of Sequential Choice in Strategic Trade Policy

• 영문명: Free-Riding Chance of Sequential Choice in Strategic Trade Policy
• 발행기관: 한국무역연구원
• 저자명: Yang Seung Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『무역연구』제11권 제2호, 51~65쪽, 전체 15쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2015.04.30

영문 초록

This paper aims at showing that a strategically delayed export subsidy can help improve national welfare more efficiently. Usually, a government attempts to subsidize domestic exporting firms because the subsidized exporting firms are believed to help enlarge national welfare by gaining more profits from an international market. When governments compete to subsidize domestic exporting firms for enlarging national welfare, there can exist a 'free-riding' situation in which the national welfare of a country can be enhanced without subsidization. This is because the subsidy competition between governments can generate more demand for certain types of goods. Thus, it can happen that a government might intentionally wait until another government's subsidy actually increases demand. That is, a government can choose a behavior of strategic delay. Theoretically, this paper explains how a strategic delay can take place in the field of trade policy.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Subsidy and Opportunity Cost

Ⅲ. Basic Model

Ⅳ. Sequential Move

Ⅴ. National Welfare and Strategic Delay

Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks

References

키워드

Strategic Trade Policy Export Subsidy Extensive Game