Optimization of Contract Design for Baseball Players

• 영문명: Optimization of Contract Design for Baseball Players
• 발행기관: 한국무역연구원
• 저자명: Yang Seung Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『무역연구』제10권 제2호, 115~132쪽, 전체 17쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2014.04.30

영문 초록

In sports, contract design is problematic. The reason is that, first, a contract is relatively short-term, and, second, player can signal to another owner while executing a contract. In the context of mechanism, it is hard to design an ex-post efficient contract because player can send hidden messages. From the principal-agent relationship, we can find an insight to derive optimality of contract for baseball players. In this paper, the main objective is to characterize optimal contract when owner encounters hidden messages from player.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Contract Design

Ⅲ. First-Best Solution

Ⅳ. Second-Best Solution

Ⅴ. Conclusion

References

키워드

Contract Theory Signaling Dynamic Game Mechanism