Counter Collusive Effect of Leniency Program

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Sangwon Park
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2012년도 한국재정학회 추계 정기학술대회, 1507~1529쪽, 전체 23쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2012.09.07

영문 초록

The leniency program is to reduce the sanction if a wrongdoer voluntarily confesses his behavior or cooperates extraordinarily with investigation authority. To study the effect of the program for self-report on collusion, we consider a repeated procurement auction model where each colluder simultaneously chooses ‘confess’ or ‘no confess' after every bidding. Unlike the previous literature which emphasizes no or only negative effect, it shows that the leniency program can be counter-collusive. The simple intuition is that a deviator of the collusion will get less sanction through his/her self-report, which makes the deviation less costly and collusion sustainment more difficult.

목차

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Basic Model

3. Conclusion

Appendix

References