Electoral Competition with Two Major Parties and Two Minor Parties

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Dongwoo Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2012년도 한국재정학회 추계 정기학술대회, 1090~1113쪽, 전체 24쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2012.09.07

영문 초록

The purpose of this article is to study a one-dimensional model of spatial electoral competition with four political parties. In this model, voters are divided into two types, the informed voters and the uninformed voters. Informed voters vote based on the policies from the four candidates, meanwhile uninformed voters vote based on the party’s expenditures that come from interest groups. Furthermore, we assume that the two of the four parties are major parties and the other two are minor parties. As major parties, they have reputational advantage; some of the informed voters only vote between two major parties according to their platforms. In this situation, we present various shaped of political equilibrium, and show their voting share in equilibrium.

목차

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Informal description of the model

3. Model

4. Final Remarks

Reference