Coalitional Manipulation on Networks

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Biung-Ghi Ju
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2011년도 추계학술대회 논문집, 603~641쪽, 전체 39쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2011.10.30

영문 초록

We study division rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by trans-fering, mergeing, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed graph) so that only connected subsets of agents can be feasible coalitions. We offer a full characterization of non-manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure. This result yields a variety of useful corollaries for specific networks such as complete network, trees, and networks without a “bridge”, and corollaries for specialized models dealing with bankruptcy, surplus sharing, cost sharing, income redistribution, social choice with transferable utility, etc.

목차

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Definitions

3. Preliminary Results

4. Theorem

5. Applications

6. Concluding Remarks

A Proofs of the Preliminary Results in Section 3

B Proofs of Theorem and Proposition 6

References

키워드

Division problem Coalitional manipulation Network Graph Reallocation-proofness No advantageous reallocation Strategy-proofness