- 영문명
- Law and Economic Analysis of the Negotiation Process
- 발행기관
- 중앙대학교 법학연구원
- 저자명
- 高鶴洙(Ko Haksoo)
- 간행물 정보
- 『법학논문집』法學論文集 第31輯 第1號, 695~719쪽, 전체 25쪽
- 주제분류
- 법학 > 법학
- 파일형태
- 발행일자
- 2007.08.30

국문 초록
영문 초록
In conducting negotiation, parties take into account various strategic issues and, when engaging in any particular type of actions, consider the other parties" expected reaction. In order to analyze the parties" strategic consideration during negotiation, use of game theory and other methodology of economics would be inevitable. At the same time, since actual negotiation takes place within the contour of legal and institutional constrains, analyzing such legal and institutional constraints would be essential for the meaningful understanding of the negotiation process.
Seen from the legal and economic perspectives, it is crucial to understand that the negotiation process is dynamic in nature and that the dynamics among the parties is in constant flux. During the negotiation process, the parties continuously update their information, adjust their judgment accordingly, and engage in strategic activities in order to influence the other parties" information and judgment. While in negotiation, the parties enter into various forms of interactive process among themselves and, in that process, a Zone of Possible Agreement may be formed and may be adjusted. Also, distributional issues are determined during the interactive process. And, sometimes, the negotiation process may fail. This article tries to provide a theoretical rendering of this complicated interactive process using concepts from game theory and information economics.
Seen from the legal and economic perspectives, it is crucial to understand that the negotiation process is dynamic in nature and that the dynamics among the parties is in constant flux. During the negotiation process, the parties continuously update their information, adjust their judgment accordingly, and engage in strategic activities in order to influence the other parties" information and judgment. While in negotiation, the parties enter into various forms of interactive process among themselves and, in that process, a Zone of Possible Agreement may be formed and may be adjusted. Also, distributional issues are determined during the interactive process. And, sometimes, the negotiation process may fail. This article tries to provide a theoretical rendering of this complicated interactive process using concepts from game theory and information economics.
목차
Ⅰ. 들어가는 말
Ⅱ. 협상에서의 긴장관계
Ⅲ. 협상을 통한 가치창출
Ⅳ. 결론
Ⅱ. 협상에서의 긴장관계
Ⅲ. 협상을 통한 가치창출
Ⅳ. 결론
키워드
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