후세인의 전쟁 선택요인에 대한 인식론적 고찰 - 1차 걸프전과 사담 후세인의 선택을 중심으로

• 영문명: Cognitive Theory of War: Saddam"s Choice of War in Desert Storm
• 발행기관: 한국중동학회
• 저자명: 박상현(Park Sang-Hyun)
• 간행물 정보: 『한국중동학회논총』제25권 제2호, 1~44쪽, 전체 44쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 지역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2005.02.01

영문 초록

  The key question to be addressed in this paper explores why Iraq with a slight chance of winning did not avoid war against the U.S. led coalition forces. Even though most war theory does give a few insights about the conditions under which weak states choose war when there is only a slight possibility of winning, explanations based on either emphasis on rationality or ignorance of interacting structure of international relations leave many practical remedies unexplained. This paper explains Iraq"s war choice on the combination of Prospect theory and Game theory. The interacting game structure of asymmetric conflicts can be summarized. Under the threat of massive retaliation by the U.S.-led coalition forces, Iraq was forced to choose between war (defection) and withdrawal (cooperation). In asymmetric conflicts, defection (war against a strong state with a slight chance of winning) is a risky gamble, and cooperation is safe choice. In contrast to Expected Utility theory, this paper implies that a weak state in a loss frame chooses risky war (defection) against a superior adversary in the hope of recovering from their crisis.

목차

Ⅰ. 들어가는 말
Ⅱ. 기존연구에 대한 고찰
Ⅲ. 전망이론(prospect theory)의 개관
Ⅳ. 전망이론과 게임이론
Ⅴ. 1차 걸프전쟁의 게임구조
Ⅵ. 손실영역의 이라크
Ⅶ. 이라크의 도박과 무력대응
Ⅷ. 닫는 말: 비대칭 분쟁과 약소국의 선택
Reference
영어 초록

키워드

비대칭 분쟁 전망이론 게임이론 1차걸프전쟁 강압외교 이라크 사담후세인 Desert Storm Prospect Theory Game Theory Asymmetric Conflict Iraq Saddam Hussein Coercive Diplomacy