대리문제에 의한 기업의 경영자지분율의 결정요인에 관한 연구

• 영문명: Agency Problems and the Determinants of Managerial Stock Ownership
• 발행기관: 인하대학교 산업경제연구소
• 저자명: 성기성
• 간행물 정보: 『경상논집』경상논집 제11집 제2호, 83~96쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1997.10.01

영문 초록

This study investigates the determinants of managerial stock ownership in the firm within the framework of agency theory through the examination of six variables- dividend pay out ratio, debt, ratio, institutional stock ownership, firm size, growth rate, and business risk. The results reveals that managerial common stock ownership is inversely related to the firm's dividend payout ratio and debt level as predicted. This study also hypothesizes that the managerial ownership is inversely related to the extent of monitoring by institutional investors. Consistent with this hypothesis, institutional stock ownership is found to be negatively related to the managerial equity holdings in the firm. However, this study suggests that both the firm size and the business risk have statistically insignificant impact on managerial stock ownership in the firm

목차

1. 서론

2. 대리문제와 경영자지분율

3. 경영자지분율의 결정요인

4. 실증적 연구

5. 요약 및 결론

참고문헌

Abstract