Do Independent Directors Monitor Family Firms? Evidence from the Market Value of Cash Holdings

• 발행기관: 한국회계정보학회
• 저자명: Kim, Jin Wook
• 간행물 정보: 『한국회계정보학회 학술대회발표집』2013년 추계학술대회 발표집, 271~289쪽, 전체 19쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 회계학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2013.10.19

영문 초록

Due to their significant stock ownership and control, founding families are generally immune from the disciplinary forces associated with the market for corporate control. As a result, founding families may spend cash on the pursuit of private benefits. In this paper, I examine whether independent directors protect outside shareholder rights from the risk of expropriation. In particular, I examine how board independence impacts a firm’s efficiency in utilizing cash reserves. I find evidence that the value of an extra dollar of unexpected cash holding is greater in family firms with a greater percentage of independent directors on their boards, suggesting that independent directors prevent the potential risk of value destruction that results from founding families’ pursuit of private benefits.

목차

I. Introduction

II. Motivation and Prior Literature

III. Research Model and Sample

IV. Empirical Results

V. Conclusion

참고문헌

키워드

Board independence Family firms Cash holdings value