R&D Subsidy and Tax Policy on International Product R&D with Spillovers

• 발행기관: 한국무역연구원
• 저자명: 양일석(Il-Seok Yang)
• 간행물 정보: 『무역연구』제14권 제6호, 1~14쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2018.12.30

영문 초록

This paper analyzes the equilibrium levels of R&D subsidies or taxes from a noncooperative product R&D policy game in two cases in which firms are monopolies in their own market segments and they compete in international markets with imperfectly substitutable goods. Furthermore, we also examine the equilibrium level of an R&D subsidy or tax from a cooperative product R&D policy game in the case that the two goods are imperfect substitutes. We use an international duopoly model in which two firms produce differentiated products and compete in a third country’s market. It is shown in a symmetric equilibrium that (i) a government’s optimal level of R&D subsidy is positive for positive R&D spillovers and zero for no R&D spillovers if the firms are monopolies in their own market segments; (ii) a government’s optimal policy is R&D subsidies for relatively high R&D spillovers and more differentiated goods and R&D taxes for relatively low R&D spillovers and less differentiated goods if the firms compete in an international market with imperfect substitutes; and (iii) a government’s optimal level of R&D subsidy or tax in harmonized R&D subsidy or tax is the same as one in the international R&D policy competition case.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. The Basic Model

Ⅲ. Optimal R&D Subsidies to an International Monopoly

Ⅳ. Optimal R&D Subsidies in International R&D Policy Competition with Imperfect Substitutes

Ⅴ. Optimal R&D Subsidies in International R&D Policy Cooperation

Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks

키워드

Policy Competition Policy Cooperation Product R&D R&D Spillovers R&D Subsidy