Rationality Through Reasoning

John Broome 지음

Wiley-Blackwell 2013년 08월 05일 출간

작품소개

책소개

Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thoughtIncludes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in usGives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thoughtContains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else.Offers a new answer to the lsquo;motivation question' of how a normative belief motivates an action.

목차

Preface xi1 Introduction 11.1 Motivation 11.2 This book 4Notes 62 Ought 82.1 The meaning of ‘ought&' 82.2 Normative and non-normative oughts 92.3 Owned and unowned oughts 122.4 Qualifi ed and unqualified oughts 25Notes 293 Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts 313.1 Sidgwick&'s View 313.2 The need to decide 343.3 Objective and prospective oughts 363.4 Valuing prospects 413.5 Summary 45Notes 454 Reasons 464.1 Introduction and preliminaries 464.2 Pro toto reasons 494.3 Pro tanto reasons 514.4 Most reason 624.5 Ownership of reasons 655 Responding to Reasons 715.1 Rationality and responding to reasons 715.2 The quick objection 745.3 Attitudinal reasons 755.4 Sufficiency of reasons 82Notes 876 Responding to Reason-Beliefs 886.1 The Enkratic Condition 886.2 Meeting your own standards 916.3 Responding correctly to P-beliefs 1016.4 Conclusion 107Notes 1087 Requirements 1097.1 Two sorts of requirement 1097.2 Property requirements 1107.3 Source requirements 1167.4 Logic for requirements? 1197.5 Ought 126Notes 1298 Conditional Requirements 1328.1 Application and content 1328.2 Conditional requirements of rationality 134Notes 146Appendix to Chapter 8 1489 Synchronic Rationality 1499.1 Introduction and method 1499.2 Consistency 1549.3 Deduction 1579.4 Instrumental Rationality 1599.5 Enkrasia 1709.6 Bayesian requirements 175Notes 17510 Diachronic Rationality 17710.1 Persistence of Intention 17710.2 The rationality of doing as you decide 18110.3 Diachronic requirements on beliefs 185Notes 6910.4 Basing prohibitions and basing permission

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저자(글) John Broome

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John Broome is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford, a fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and an Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. He is the author of amongst others Weighing Goods (1991), Ethics Out of Economics (1999), Weighing Lives (2004), and Climate matters (2012).